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 Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the prospect of ethical decision making in autonomous machines. 
Continuous progress in the field of artificial intelligence has given rise to machines that are 
operating more and more autonomously from humans. Autonomous here is not meant in the 
philosophical sense i.e. having free will, but that they are operating without direct intervention 
by humans. While they are not conscious or acting intentionally, they are capable of operating 
on their own and making decisions. Previously they have been performing rather simple and 
safe tasks, but this is changing rapidly. The well-known example of self-driving cars illustrates 
the extent of complexity that their behaviour can have.  
Machines like this raise several questions about their safety and trustworthiness. When 
they start operating around us, people need to know that these machines are not a threat to them 
or their loved ones and that they can be trusted.  
To avoid problems like that, these machines need to be able to behave ethically at least 
in their domain. There is a relatively new field of research called machine ethics, which engages 
in problems like this. This field is attempting to answer the questions if and how is it possible 
to create machines that behave ethically. 
In my thesis I explore how ethical principles could be implemented in autonomous 
machines and whether these machines can make ethical decisions.  
The first chapter will explain what artificial intelligence (AI) is and how they are 
classified. There are several different classifications of AI, I am going to present one of them. 
It does not appeal to be one and only way, instead it describes AI in the context that is relevant 
to this thesis. After that I will give an overview of different types of ethics of AI: roboethics 
and machine ethics. In the end of the chapter I will discuss why there is a need for machine 
ethics. 
The second chapter discusses different possibilities of implementing ethical principles 
in the machine. This chapter covers both the classical ethical theories and the alternative 
approaches. It also gives a few examples of experiments that have been conducted in this area. 
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The purpose of this chapter is not to find the best ethical approach for machines, but instead to 
give an overview of advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches.  
The third chapter covers the internal model which supports the machine in ethical 
decision making by enabling it to predict a possible chain of events and simulate the possible 
actions to take. This allows the machine to find the best ethical action for the current situation. 
The concept of an internal model is not specific to ethics, but in this case it is examined as a 
tool that can be used in the interest of ethical decision making. 
In the fourth chapter an overview of the nature of a machine’s decisions will be given 
and the limitations of a machine’s ethical decisions discussed. It touches aspects of why an 
ethical machine is not equal to a human as a moral agent, who is responsible for the machine’s 
decisions and why a machine cannot have a moral status. It is concluded that a machine cannot 
make ethical decisions in the same sense as humans do, however, a machine is capable of 
making decisions that are considered ethically correct in a particular situation. 
  
1. Intelligent machines 
1.1 What is artificial intelligence? 
 
Science fiction movies and literature tend to portray AI as conscious, self-aware robots 
or computer systems that are often hostile towards humans. The reality is much less dramatic. 
The possibility of conscious machines has been debated a lot over the years, some saying that 
it cannot be done and others being convinced they will be created some time in this century.  
There have been a lot of debates on what exactly artificial intelligence (AI) means and there are 
many different definitions of it.  Here are couple of ways it can be defined: artificial intelligence 
is a research field that is dedicated to building artefacts which display intelligent behaviour 
(Arkoudas & Bringsjord, 2014: 34).  
Artificial intelligence, the ability of a digital computer or computer-
controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent 
beings. (Copeland, 2016) 
What is meant by intelligence when people are talking about AI? This is often rather 
vaguely explained and might get confusing when considering the wide variety of different 
aspects of this field with many contrasting solutions that have been created. Human intelligence 
itself can be understood in multiple ways. In case of AI, intelligence is mainly involved with 
learning, reasoning, problem solving, perception and language processing (Copeland, 2016). In 
the highly regarded textbook “Artificial intelligence: a modern approach”, intelligence is 
mainly seen as being concerned with rational action (Russell & Norvig, 2009: 30). 
There are several ways to classify different types of artificial intelligence. For the 
purpose of this work, they will be referred to by the extent of their intellectual capabilities. 
Narrow AI (also referred to as a weak AI or an applied AI) is a computer intelligence 
that is capable of acting in a single domain (Pennachin & Goertzel 2007: 1). It means that this 
kind of AI has been developed to do one specific practical task and it can be very effective at 
it, often outperforming humans. A recent example would be Google’s AlphaGo winning four 
out of five matches of Go against world champion Lee Sedol (Metz, 2016). When we compare 
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a narrow AI to human intelligence, it could be seen as a human having some specific type of 
skill. 
While the narrow AI can be very good at the task that it was made for, it is unable to do 
or learn anything else. Neither a chess playing AI nor AlphaGo would know what to do if they 
had to play checkers or tic-tac-toe. It cannot adapt to other domains, which is why it is called a 
narrow AI. Examples of the narrow AI are self-driving cars, facial or speech recognition 
software, robotic security guards, computer algorithms that trade stocks, etc. 
Artificial general intelligence (AGI) is not restricted to any single area and should be 
able to act in a diverse range of domains (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014: 318). C. Pennachin 
and B. Goertzel (2007: 7) have concluded that to emulate human intelligence, AGI should have 
the following abilities: both general and domain-specific problem solving, which it must be 
capable of unifying if necessary, ability to learn from different sources such as the environment, 
other systems, teachers, ability to improve at solving new problems through experience. 
In the discussions about AGI, one often comes across the term “strong AI” which was 
originally coined by J. Searle (1980: 417). His definition was rather different from what is 
understood as AGI. What Searle meant by “strong AI“ is a computer that was programmed in 
a way that it actually is a mind, it has understanding and other cognitive states (Searle, 1980: 
417).  
In 1962, I. J. Good brought forward the idea of an ultra-intelligent machine (now more 
commonly called superintelligence), the intellectual capacity of which would far exceed any 
human intellectual capacity in existence. Good suggested that since designing machines is one 
of man’s intellectual activities, then an ultra-intelligent machine would be able to create even 
better machines, which would lead to an “intelligence explosion“ (Good, 1965: 31-33). 
Superintelligence or super-human-level machine intelligence would be the next step from AGI 
(Bostrom, 2014: 4). 
Together with AGI and superintelligence there are often talks about singularity. It 
represents a theoretical point in time where the superintelligence has evolved to the level that 
is incomprehensible to the human mind and the change is so radical that further events become 
unpredictable (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 57).  
Unlike AGI and superintelligence, which still do not exist, narrow AI is already 
embedded into our everyday lives and its usage is growing daily. With the rapid development 
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of AI there are also starting to appear robots or machines that operate autonomously, without 
constant supervision by humans. Most of the spotlight in this area is on self-driving cars, but 
these are just one example. There are advances with autonomous military robots, care robots in 
hospitals and nursing homes etc. At this point it is important to note that not all robots contain 
AI, but a robot can be controlled by AI. In the following text, “machine” refers to a machine 
that is equipped with narrow artificial intelligence. 
 
1.2 Ethics of artificial intelligence 
 
The ethics of artificial intelligence could be divided into two distinct branches: roboethics 
and machine ethics. 
1.2.1 Roboethics 
 
Roboethics is a term that was coined by G. Veruggio at the First International 
Symposium on Roboethics in 2004 (Veruggio & Abney, 2011: 348). The main focus here is on 
ethical issues concerning the creation of robots and their application in society. Along with 
these come questions about protecting human dignity and limiting the divide and inequalities 
that could be created by robots replacing people in the workplaces and other walks of life. 
(Veruggio & Abney, 2011: 347) 
Roboethics is a human-centered branch of ethics that promotes the development of 
robotics to advance human society. It attempts to achieve ethical, social and legal framework 
of robotics as well as professional ethics of roboticists. (Veruggio & Abney, 2011: 348)  
1.2.2 Machine ethics 
 
S. Torrance ( 2011: 116) defines machine ethics as a discipline that is concerned with 
designing machines that do things; which, when made by humans, could indicate that human 
as having an ethical status. It is investigating whether it is possible to create machines that make 
ethical decisions and behave ethically.  
Are machines capable of acting ethically? Can ethics be made computable? (S. L. 
Anderson, 2011b: 163-164) Can machines be moral agents? Which moral standards should be 
implemented in the machine? (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 58, 78) Which ethical theories can be 
used as a basis for ethical machines? (Gips, 2011: 252) These are some of the questions that 
machine ethics is concerned with.  
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Machine ethics is not only interested in creating ethical machines, it is also examining 
ethics itself through the help of artificial intelligence. Several authors have seen AI as an 
opportunity to improve our understanding of ethics. M. Guarini (2011: 316) used artificial 
neural networks and machine learning to explore ethical reasoning in classification of moral 
situations. S. L. Anderson (2011: 25) says that machine ethics can help us to understand better 
what is ethical behaviour in practice, because implementing ethical principles requires a 
detailed approach rather than abstract reasoning. H. Seville and D. G. Field (2011) see AI as a 
possible assistant in ethical decision making. 
 
1.3 Do machines need ethics?   
 
They do not. Humans are the ones that actually need machines to have ethics. Machines 
that start acting autonomously in the world raise questions about safety and trustworthiness. 
Following the laws and ethical norms could alleviate these concerns. Laws are normally written 
down in a great detail, which cannot always be said about ethical standards and norms. For a 
self-driving car, it is relatively easy to follow traffic rules, but how should it act in a situation 
where there is group of people on the road and the only way to avoid driving into them is to 
crash into the wall on the roadside, which would kill its passengers? 
 Humans already trust computers and software. Using online banking software means 
that they trust software with their finances and personal data. Many medical devices for 
measuring or monitoring vital signs and administering drugs run software for doing that, so 
people trust their health with computers. Different kinds of security systems that guard property 
and people from intruders also run on software, so therefore people trust their safety to 
computers.  
 However, all of what was previously mentioned is not quite autonomous, many aspects 
of those solutions are directly or at least occasionally controlled by a human. Autonomous 
machines are very different in that sense. They are capable of decision making and operating 
completely on their own. Of course, there are already some autonomous machines in everyday 
use like robot vacuum cleaners, but not much ethics are expected from them and the main 
question of trust in this case is whether the floor really got clean or is there some spot left 
untouched. On the other hand, when self-driving cars would finally reach the point of common 
use, they are directly related to questions of safety and life and death. This kind of autonomy 
changes these aspects drastically. 
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 It is not possible to hardcode all the right actions and outcomes for all possible situations 
into a machine. Engineers of the ethical machine cannot predict all possible situations and 
dilemmas that the machine will come across during its operational period. This means that we 
need to be able to create machines that can behave ethically on their own. 
 2. On implementability of ethical approaches in a machine 
 
To be able to make ethical decisions, machines need to base their decisions on some 
ethical system or theory. At this point of time there is not a single universal ethical theory that 
is accepted by everyone and could be applied everywhere. Ethical norms and expectations tend 
to vary a lot throughout the world and communities. They are affected and formed by many 
different factors such as local traditions, religion, laws, and unwritten rules in communities. 
There are some views that are relatively common worldwide. Killing, stealing and lying are 
some of those acts that are unethical in most cultures but even then there are exceptions.  
There are societies that do not have private property and no rules for stealing. In others 
lying or killing is prohibited only inside a local group while encouraged towards outsiders. 
Moral diversity does not have to occur only between societies, often times it can be observed 
also inside a single society. For example, vegetarians who believe that raising animals for food 
is wrong exist in the same society as non-vegetarians. Also, strict egoists, who see no point in 
helping others, live side by side with people who see the reasons for helping others. (Harman 
& Thomson, 1995: 9-11) 
The high variation in moral differences adds considerable challenges to creating an 
ethical machine. Not only does it require finding a suitable principle to implement, these 
machines may also need to be customizable per society or region to meet local expectations and 
norms. 
There are several different ways to approach the implementation of ethics. It has been 
somewhat common in the machine ethics field to divide them into top-down, bottom-up, and 
hybrid approaches. This concept is also adopted in this thesis, since it enables clear 
categorization of the approaches. The top-down approach is based on established ethical 
theories, the bottom-up approaches use artificial evolution and machine learning as the means 
to discover ethical principles (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 79-80). The hybrid approaches try to 
combine these two in a way that compensates their shortcomings or complements each other. 
The predominant issue that comes up mainly with top-down approaches is the 
abstractness of the moral norms and concepts. Machines operate on a very detailed level, high 
level abstract concept like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ can be hard to convey to them.  
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Currently, in the fields where machine learning is used, artificial neural networks are 
trained with a very large number of examples until they are able to start making conclusions. 
In case of ethics, this kind of approach may be very time consuming, since it would likely 
require a large number of similar examples of situations which illustrate the concept they are 
trying to learn. Humans can often learn from very few or even single examples, which makes 
the process faster. From machine ethics point of view it would be very useful if machine 
learning also reached this point at some time. There is at least one company, Geometric 
Intelligence1, that is working on this research but they have not published results yet. 
 
2.1 Top-Down approaches 
 
 Under top-down approaches utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics will be 
examined as possible grounds for an ethical machine.  
2.1.1 Actions guided by consequences 
 
J. Bentham (1907) defined the principle of utility as a principle which approves any 
action that increases the happiness or disapproves any action that decreases it in regard of all 
those concerned. Rightness or wrongness of the action depends on its consequences, whether 
it increases happiness or causes unhappiness. 
S. L. Anderson (2011) draws attention to some advantages that a machine could have 
compared to a human who follows utilitarianism. The calculation of happiness and desirability 
- machines are strict in the calculations, while humans tend to guess or estimate values and 
make assumptions on which action would give better results. This can easily result in error. 
Humans have a tendency to be partial and decide in favour of themselves or some people close 
to them while disregarding others who are affected by their actions. Machines on the other hand 
can be designed to be completely neutral. People also are more likely not to consider all relevant 
actions and circumstances, especially when it is a highly complicated situation with possible 
actions that have far-reaching consequences, while machines can be more thorough in their 
analysis. (S. L. Anderson, 2011:163)  
                                                          
1 For more information on this company’s approach can be found in the interview with the founder and CEO of 
the company Gary Marcus in the MIT Technology Review https://www.technologyreview.com/s/544606/can-
this-man-make-aimore-human/ (last accessed at 17.04.2016) 
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J. Gips defined four features that an utilitarian machine should have: 
1. A way of describing the situation in the world 
2. A way of generating possible actions 
3. A means of predicting the situation that would result if an action 
were taken given the current situation 
4. A method of evaluating a situation in terms of its goodness or 
desirability (Gips, 2011:245) 
First three involve their own complications, but are relatively straightforward tasks 
compared to the fourth. The first one deals with continuously acquiring data from the world 
about the present moment and interpreting it accurately in real time. The amount of data in this 
case can be very large with a high noise to signal ratio, which means that the algorithm that 
separates relevant information from the noise must be optimized for speed and accuracy. The 
second task must be able to take the interpretation of the situation from the first task and 
generate, based on the given data, all the possible actions that the agent can take. The third one 
needs to run a simulation for each possible action and analyse the consequences. This 
immediately gives rise to the question of how far-reaching should the consequences being 
considered be?  There needs to be some way to reasonably limit the scope of the simulation, 
both in the sense of how far into the future consequences will be included and how many 
variables need to be considered in relation to each action. Trying to encompass absolutely 
everything even seemingly relevant would create either a never-ending simulation or it would 
occupy all available resources so exhaustively that the machine could get stuck with the 
simulation. Also, the further into the future consequences the calculation goes, the more 
inaccurate it will become, because of the number of unforeseen variables and circumstances 
that can enter into the equation. 
While the first three are mainly data processing and calculation issues, the fourth one 
creates a much different problem - how to evaluate the goodness or desirability of the situation? 
Since in classic utilitarianism each person counts equally and there are no hierarchies, the 
machine should calculate the amount of happiness and pain caused by the action to each affected 
person and sum it up. This would give the total amount of happiness and pain caused by each 
action and machine should choose the action with highest total happiness. (Gips, 2011:245) A 
rather simple formula, except how does one measure happiness or desirability? Gips himself 
evades the direct answer here by saying that measuring is up to the creators of the machine and 
their theory of value. W. Wallach and C. Allen (2009:89) mention an option of gathering as 
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many subjective utility ratings as possible, applying a weighing formula to these and then 
incrementally fine-tuning the machine’s decisions and actions until they are adequate enough. 
They do not specify how exactly the collection of this data is supposed to be done, but they do 
admit that there would be serious difficulties in gathering the assessments in real time. 
J. Bentham (1907) mentions seven circumstances that determine the value of pleasure 
and pain caused by the act to people affected: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, 
propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent (represents the number of persons who 
are affected by the act). For every person that is affected by the act, using these circumstances, 
a calculation can be made, where pleasure is summed up on the one side and pain on the other. 
After that, summing up these numbers over all the affected people, would show whether the 
balance is towards pleasure or pain, which will give the general tendency towards good or bad 
of that particular act. (Bentham, 1907) 
The very same procedure of calculating the morality of the action is what makes 
utilitarianism appealing to machine ethics. On the other hand, aforementioned problems with 
gathering and assigning values to the involved variables seem to undermine this possibility.  
According to utilitarianism, the end justifies the means and the end goal is maximizing 
the happiness. Following these principles might result in acts that are unjust or seem morally 
problematic. For example, imagine a case where a doctor kills one healthy person to harvest his 
organs that will save the lives of five others. In the big picture this would result in five happy 
people who can go on living, which means their combined happiness is bigger than the killed 
person’s happiness could ever have been. Does not seem a very moral thing to do, but on 
utilitarian grounds, it is justified. If pure utilitarianism was implemented as a moral principle 
for a machine to follow, it may very well result in similar situations. While this robot may not 
necessarily start harvesting organs, it could start maximizing happiness in some other situations 
that would end up in morally questionable actions and serious damage to people or their 
property. (Grau, 2011: 453) 
The exact implementation of utilitarianism to the machine does not seem feasible, but it 
also should not be ruled out entirely. It could be used as an additional measure in dilemmas 
where for example rules do not offer solution. To be usable, it should be implemented with 
limited scope, meaning it considers a short range of actions and those who are immediately 
affected. This may not guarantee maximum happiness, but can add additional weight to one of 
the options in dilemma and enable making a choice. 
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2.1.2 Rules as basis of ethical decisions 
 
Deontological approaches would see machines making decisions and acting according 
to a set of rules. Rules can be turned into an algorithm for a machine, which it would use to 
compute its ethical decisions. (Abney, 2011: 41)  
One of the most famous deontological approaches that was geared specifically towards 
robots, is I. Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics. Regardless of the fact that he had prioritized 
them in a way that should have minimized conflicts between laws, he later kept demonstrating 
in his stories that these rules nevertheless would lead to deadlocks in a robot. (Abney, 2011: 
42-43) 
I. Kant’s Categorical Imperative is another deontological approach that is widely 
debated in machine ethics. T. M. Powers has proposed that Kantian ethics could be used as a 
basis for an ethical machine if Kant’s ethics is not followed strictly. Instead he focuses on a 
machine computable categorical imperative. (Powers, 2011: 466) 
He suggests the possibility that a machine might be able to build a theory of ethics by 
using a universalization step on maxims and aligning them to the categories of forbidden, 
permissible and obligatory actions. Powers specifically states that it should not be a human who 
creates the moral laws for the machine, because then it would human ethics, not machine ethics. 
(Powers, 2011: 466) Powers is not very clear on how the machine would find the maxims. Since 
they should not come from us, it seems that therefore they should be somehow generated by a 
machine, but the question is – based on what? To speculate, if the machine has been fed 
descriptive information about the world, then it might be the grounds from which to start. This 
is one option but I am not making any claims on whether Powers meant something similar or 
not. 
For a rule to be universal, it must fit into the system of rules that applies to all agents 
and must be consistent with other rules that have been generated in the same manner. This is 
what has been interpreted as a two-step consistency check of universalizability and 
systematicity. The machine would build a theory of forbidden maxims which would state what 
it ought not to do. After that it would move on to obligatory maxims which specify what the 
machine ought to do, and then permissible maxims that are neither obligatory nor forbidden. 
(Powers, 2011: 466-467)  
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When two or more rules conflict, there is no principle that would specify how to 
prioritize them, which would require creating a procedure for a machine to decide the priorities 
of rules (Powers, 2011: 472). Conflict of rules is an issue that one comes across in many 
deontological systems that would create a problem in the machine following them. Two 
opposing rules can create a deadlock in a machine that would bring it to a situation where it 
ceases operation since it cannot take any actions or would seemingly attempt to take multiple 
actions simultaneously. Another version of this problem is a situation where the conflict 
happens within the same rule. When two people are in danger and the machine can save only 
one, how should it decide? What if it cannot make a decision at all and both people die?  
Therefore with creating this kind of a machine, a principle to avoid these conflicts must 
also be created. Even a bad decision can be sometimes be better than no decision at all. The 
aforementioned limited utilitarian procedure could be one option. It can be used to measure 
which conflicting rule gives the most positive outcome (or the least negative) and decide to 
follow that rule.  
Wallach and Allen (2009) have also offered an option of how categorical imperative 
could be implemented in a machine. Of course there is the problem that machines do not have 
a will, so they cannot will anything to be a universal law. Despite of this, the categorical 
imperative can be used by a machine as a formal tool to check if the maxim is moral by 
comparing whether the goal is attainable if other agents acted in the same way in a particular 
situation. Three elements are required for running this simulation model – a goal, a course of 
action, and a statement of the circumstances under which to achieve this goal. This kind of 
simulation could then show what would be the outcome of pursuing a specific goal, if all agents 
acted upon the same maxim. Wallach and Allen suggest that using this tool may not be suitable 
for every machine, because it would require a lot of computing power. (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 
95)  
In regard of the required computing power I disagree with them. This simulation does 
not have to depict each and every individual agent that there is, instead it could do calculations 
for an estimated total numbers of these agents and the collective impact of them when acting 
on maxim. This would make the simulation achievable to a much wider range of machines. 
R. Shafer-Landau (2009) brings to attention that universalizability does not necessarily 
guarantee that a maxim is moral. For example, if a bank robber does not rob the bank for his 
personal gain, but to destroy its business. If everybody did that, banks would go out of business, 
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which means that the maxim is universalizable, but it definitely is not moral. (Shafer-landau, 
2009: 154) In this light it is not hard to see how a machine, which only follows universalization 
check, can end up with maxims that are not moral. This means it still needs additional means 
to assess the morality of these maxims. 
R. Tonkens (2009) says that a Kantian machine cannot be created at all, because it would 
be anti-Kantian. Kantian ethics requires an agent to be free to be a moral agent. A machine is 
not free, which would make it anti-Kantian. Also, creating these machines would be anti-
Kantian, because they would be treated only as means, and not as ends. (Tonkens, 2009: 429-
431) 
Another theory that could be categorized under deontology, even though it is not as strict 
as some other theories may be, is prima facie duties. It maintains that there are no absolute 
duties, rather there are duties that people should try to follow and which can be overridden by 
other duties which in a particular situation have a higher importance. The problem with this 
theory (as with several other deontological approaches) is that it does not have the decision 
procedure for determining which duty prevails in case of a conflict. A human actor, again, could 
use intuition, but this does not apply to a machine. (Anderson & Anderson, 2011: 476) 
 To overcome this issue, M. and S. L. Anderson (2011) focused on the problem of 
discovering the decision-making principle that could be used by a machine to determine the 
correct action in case of conflicting duties. For establishing the prototype solution to the 
problem, they chose Beauchamp and Childress’s principles of biomedical ethics, which is a 
prima facie duty theory that has four duties. Andersons used three of them: patient’s autonomy, 
non-maleficence and beneficence. The ethical dilemma that was used as a basis for working out 
the decision principle was the one where the patient refuses to follow the treatment that was 
recommended by the doctor. The question is whether the doctor should accept the patient’s 
rejection or try to change the patient’s mind? (Anderson & Anderson, 2011: 477) 
They gave different numerical values to the factors that influenced the outcome and 
gave examples of preferred actions for four cases, so that a machine-learning procedure which 
used inductive logic programming was able to extract a general principle for decision-making. 
This principle was used by the Andersons for developing two applications: MedEthEx - a 
medical advisor system and EthEl - a medication-reminder system for the elderly. (Anderson 
& Anderson, 2011: 478-480) 
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This experiment could be seen as a proof of concept due to its very limited scope and 
data. The data was given to the machine by its creators, it did not acquire it itself nor had the 
means to do that. It does not give a good indication whether it would work in large scale 
systems. The main concern in my opinion is whether this same approach can be used for a 
machine that operates in one domain but comes across many different situations. Is it capable 
of successfully executing this same prioritization procedure on the run? It is unlikely that it 
could be ran in advance to be prepared for situations. One option would be that the results from 
previous situations are saved and used as heuristics for situations that are similar enough. 
Another option would be using earlier results as seed information for the procedure to avoid 
starting from zero. Also, it can be approached as a range where based on the percentage of the 
similarity with the current case, previous results are either used verbatim or used as basis for 
new results by combining data. 
As could be seen from above, the deontological approach is attractive to machine ethics 
because of rules that could be turned into algorithm. The disadvantages are possible conflicts 
between rules and within the same rule. Before implementation there needs to exist an 
established procedure for a machine, on how to deal with these conflicts. Also, rules need to be 
made detailed enough and they need to be substantial enough, so they can be applied to a 
necessary range of situations. 
 
2.1.3 Machines of virtue  
 
Virtue ethics is an approach that instead of duties and consequences focuses on building 
a good character. Instead of asking which actions one should take, it asks what kind of a person 
one should be. (Hursthouse, 2003)  
Wallach and Allen (2009) explore whether it is possible to program virtues into a 
machine. The first major problem is that virtues can contain complicated patterns of motivation 
and desire and may affect a large number of the actions one takes. Broad virtues, such as 
kindness, can cause situations where the machine, while checking whether an action is 
compatible with a virtue, can become stuck in endless loop. For example, in a situation where 
two people request something from a machine but it is capable of fulfilling only one request. 
Let us say that both of these requests are equal by nature and the person whose request will not 
be fulfilled would consider the machine to be unkind. Being unkind, however, is unacceptable 
to the machine, because it has been programmed to be kind. How should the machine decide 
18 Rene Tõnisson – Can Autonomous Machines Make Ethical Decisions? 
 
which request to fulfil? Unless some fall-back mechanism has been implemented for situations 
like that, the machine very likely cannot make the decision. (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 120) 
The example above presents a machine that is rigidly kind, it cannot handle situations 
that it cannot fully cover with its virtue. This suggests that the machine cannot be 100% 
virtuous, it has to be able handle exceptions for dilemmas. When a human who is kind ends up 
in this situation, most likely he/she will fill one person’s wish, acknowledge the fact that he/she 
cannot fulfil both and accept that the other person may consider it unkind. Similar exception 
handling needs to be implemented in a machine for it to be able to actually function (and not 
get stuck in dilemmas on regular basis). 
Wallach and Allen (2009) bring out an important benefit of the broad virtues - it is 
stability and trust that they could create over a wide range of features. If one demonstrates virtue 
in one situation, then it is likely that one acts similarly in other similar situations. Stability over 
a wide range of circumstances is particularly attractive in case of machines, since an ethical 
machine needs to be reliable and predictable. (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 120-121) 
It is hard to see, though, how exactly implementing a virtuous character into machines 
would take place. They are normally created to act with a certain purpose, not built for their 
character. Gips (2011: 249) says that nowadays virtue-based systems tend to be converted to 
the deontological system e.g. act courageously instead of be courageous. This would very likely 
happen in case of machines also. Even if a machine was built with character, it would still end 
up evaluating actions against some criteria that would be its “character traits“ that qualify or 
disqualify the action. If these “character traits“ were called rules, would there actually be a 
difference? As long as we’re dealing with narrow AI in the machines, the virtue approach does 
not seem reasonable or even implementable option. 
 
2.2 Bottom-up approaches 
 
The ‘bottom up’ approach takes a completely opposite path to the development of the 
ethical machine. Instead of trying to implement a specific existing ethical theory, it attempts to 
introduce moral values to the machine through evolution and learning. This could be a relatively 
slow process, since evolution and learning through experience, trial and error, and unsuccessful 
strategies is time-consuming. (Allen, Smit, & Wallach, 2005: 151)  
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On the other hand, considering the sheer complexity of ethics and morality, it seems 
reasonable that their machine implementation is not a short term project. Even the development 
of simpler machines that do not appeal to such intricacy can take considerable time. 
2.2.1 Possibility of ethics through machine evolution 
 
Wallach and Allen (2009) point out an idea from sociobiology that the origin of morality 
may lie in human evolution. Inspired by this, they see genetic algorithms and artificial life 
(ALife) simulations as one potential source for developing machine agents with ethical 
behaviour. In genetic algorithms, populations of robots vary slightly from each other and are 
evaluated on how they perform at certain task. Success (fitness) is measured by assigning a 
score to their performance. Best performing robots are used to generate new population, by 
recombining their components and adding small random mutations. This process is repeated for 
many generations, which results in continuous improvement of their performance. (Wallach & 
Allen, 2009: 100-101) 
At this time, ALife simulations are still far from the complexity of the real world and 
experiments for evolving ethical machines there cannot be made, yet. Nonetheless, due to 
continuous progress towards more sophisticated virtual worlds, researching evolution of ethics 
in ALife could one day be a possibility. (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 104-105) 
If human ethics and morality are a result of human evolution, then using ALife and 
evolutionary algorithms could be an interesting opportunity for ethics in general. Simulating 
evolution though artificial agents could give an insight into moral decision making in humans 
today and why morality has reached its current state. 
2.2.2 Ethics through learning 
 
People acquire morality normally by learning through experience, which gives an idea 
that maybe it could be done by machines also. However, machine learning is far from the level 
of learning that humans are capable of. In moral development, children receive feedback in 
form of reward, punishment, approval and disapproval. While machines would need some sort 
of feedback in their learning, too, it is hard to find similar equivalents in a computer. (Wallach 
& Allen, 2009: 106-107)  
There does exist model in machine learning that uses reward for the right action. It is 
called reinforcement learning. In this case nobody tells the machine what the right actions are, 
instead, it receives feedback called reward that indicates that it took the right action. What is 
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indicated as a reward varies a lot, depending on the task that the machine is learning. For 
example, if the machine learns to play table tennis, then every point that it scores is a reward or 
if it is learning to crawl then forward movement can be reward. The important aspect here is 
that the reward must be something specific that a machine can recognize from all the other 
inputs it receives. (Russell & Norvig, 2009: 830) In case of ethical situations, it may not be easy 
to find such reward which confirms that the machine made the right decision. Quite likely it 
can be found for the same type of situations but if the situations vary a lot, there may not be this 
common denominator to identify the right outcome. 
If we were to create a machine which would acquire ethical understanding through 
learning, it cannot be released into society from day one, because at that moment it is not yet 
an ethical machine. Instead, it would be a clean slate, ethics wise. It will only just start learning 
through simulations and later can be gradually integrated into society. 
At this time there is no clear model of how humans learn. Assembling diverse fragments 
of information with background knowledge by analogy and other processes is something that 
cannot be done by machine learning, yet. This does not necessarily mean that there is something 
fundamentally different between human and machine learning or that machines could never 
learn like humans. Instead it insinuates to the problem that there are still significant gaps in our 
understanding the process. (Danks, 2014: 161) Nevertheless, even if the machine cannot learn 
like a human, it is important that it uses some kind of learning, so it could adjust and update 
itself in its environment. (Allen et al., 2005: 152) 
There are several potential dangers with learning machines, especially if they are 
learning on their own without supervision. A somewhat obvious one is that a machine might 
learn the wrong things and as a result develop into an immoral machine. (Wallach & Allen, 
2009: 110) The question is, how will the machine tell the difference between ethical and 
unethical or good and bad in its learning process. If this machine starts from a clean slate, then 
it does not know what “ethical” is and at least for some period of time would need to be trained 
with clear examples prepared by its creators. 
The machine could also start altering its code and bypass built-in constraints, unleashing 
unwanted features with unexpected consequences. One possible solution to the self-
modification problem could be a layered architecture, where the lower level protocols are 
isolated from the higher level functionality, which would make them inaccessible to the parts 
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that learn and process new information. Of course this does not guarantee that somehow the 
learning machine is not able to circumvent these restrictions. (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 110-111) 
Self-reprogramming machines are mostly talked about in topics of AGI and 
superintelligence, where the idea is that AGI keeps creating improved versions of itself until it 
reaches superintelligence (Bostrom, 2014: 29). Machine’s ability to completely reprogram itself 
still lies further in the future, but self-modifying machines themselves actually already exist. It 
is called autonomic computing and it was introduced in 2001 by IBM. These systems are 
capable of self-configuring, self-healing (repairing software and hardware problems), self-
optimizing and self-protecting (defending against attacks and cascading failures). (Kephart & 
Chess, 2003: 41-43) It is possible that some autonomous machines will also receive some level 
of ability to self-maintenance, whether it is self-configuration or fixing problematic code. 
Considering that these are not AGI level systems (which we are still far from), they most likely 
will not have the ability to create more advanced versions of themselves, but there is still the 
risk of bad repair that will change its behaviour. This is why there should be some parts of the 
system that cannot be fixed autonomously. 
To create a general ethics machine through learning, it needs to be able to learn similarly 
to humans – on its own, unsupervised, and be able to judge what is and what is not ethical 
behaviour. Only this way it could adapt on its own to new regions, otherwise it would have to 
be customized for every new country or region in the world. An AI that is capable of learning 
generally, like a human, is more likely to be AGI than a narrow AI. While machine learning 
has not reached this level yet, it can still be used as an effective additional tool for the ethical 
machine. 
 
2.3 Hybrid approaches, combining top-down and bottom-up 
 
There is a possibility that neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches alone are enough 
for creating an ethical machine and instead it is necessary to combine both of them into a hybrid 
approach. Top-down approaches capture generic concerns of what is and what is not acceptable 
behaviour; bottom-up approaches, through evolving and learning, can provide systems with 
flexibility and choices that cannot be retrieved from the rigidity of top-down systems (Wallach 
& Allen, 2009: 117-118). Top-down systems are often rather broad and abstract, which 
complicate their implementation. Bottom-up approach might be of help here by making them 
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more specific with learning through examples. A few examples of possible hybrid approaches 
are discussed below.  
In a highly complicated game of Go, Google’s artificial intelligence AlphaGo beat the 
world champion Lee Sedol (Metz, 2016). In any game, just knowing the rules is not enough to 
be good at the game, the player has to learn to play the game. Just programming in the rules 
was not enough for AlphaGo to win, it had to learn to play. Its neural networks were trained 
with expert human moves and it also played many games between its own neural networks 
(Silver et al., 2016:484).  
Even though AlphaGo is not ethics related, this idea might be adaptable in machine 
ethics. For example, creating a machine with a hybrid approach that combines deontological 
theory from top-down and machine learning from bottom-up. There would be defined rules for 
the machine to follow, which it would learn to apply by learning through examples and by 
“playing through“ simulated life-like situations under human supervision. 
It is obvious that there are many things that make it much easier for a machine to learn 
a game than it is to learn ethics. A game has a set of possible moves and a fixed area for 
movements on table. It also has straightforward non-abstract rules that define the game. Ethics 
can be much vaguer in a wide, highly complex world with an unknown number of possible 
situations. This makes it clear that it will be a lot harder to create a system that is capable of 
this kind of learning, which does not mean that in the long run it cannot be done.  
Another example of a hybrid approach is an experiment, conducted by M. A. Pontier 
and J. F. Hoorn. They combined a bottom-up structure with top-down moral duties. It balances 
duties with computed levels of morality which is the estimated influence on the total amount of 
utility in the world. The system (moral reasoner) is connected to the Silicon Coppélia (SC), 
which is a cognitive model of emotional intelligence and affective decision making. (Pontier & 
Hoorn, 2012: 2199) 
In the simulation they focused on biomedical ethics, because it has an established wide 
consensus on what is ethical. Also, healthcare is a domain where the use of robots is on the rise 
due to a predicted lack of resources and qualified personnel. As for moral duties, they chose to 
concentrate on autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence. (Pontier & Hoorn, 2012: 2199) 
The system has library of goals which have a level of ambition for every agent. Levels 
of ambition that an agent attaches to the goals have a real value between [-1,1], where negative 
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value means an undesired and positive value a desired goal. A higher value means a higher 
importance to the agent. (Pontier & Hoorn, 2012: 2199) 
The library also contains actions that an agent can perform. Actions also have a real 
value between [-1,1] where a negative value means an action is inhibiting the goal and a positive 
value means an action is facilitating the goal. The expected utility of an action is calculated by 
looking at its influence on the goal. (Pontier & Hoorn, 2012: 2200) 
The three duties - autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence - are seen by an agent as 
moral goals. These ambition levels of these moral duties were set in a way that autonomy had 
the highest ambition level and beneficence had the lowest. The estimated level of the morality 
of an action is calculated by an agent by taking the sum of the ambition levels of the moral 
goals multiplied with the beliefs that the actions facilitate the moral goals. (Pontier & Hoorn, 
2012: 2200) 
To be able to verify whether the moral reasoner was capable of simulating ethical 
decision making similarly to experts of medical ethics or not, they took test cases for 
experiments from A. E. Buchanan’s and D. W. Brock’s book „Deciding for Others: The Ethics 
of Surrogate Decision Making“ (1989). (Pontier & Hoorn, 2012: 2200) 
They ran six experiments with scenarios where a patient refused treatment for different 
reasons (fear, religion, false beliefs etc.) with the question being whether the doctor should 
accept the patient’s decision or try to persuade him to change his mind. Expert analyses of these 
cases were taken from the aforementioned book. (Pontier & Hoorn, 2012: 2200-2201) 
The results showed that the moral reasoner reached the same conclusions as experts. A 
notable case was experiment number 2. During the development of the system, the author had 
added a specific rule to the moral reasoner to ensure that the decisions of fully autonomous 
patients would not be questioned. That same rule was the reason why in experiment 2 (refusal 
because of religious beliefs) the system reached the same conclusion as experts. Without it, the 
moral reasoner would have reached an incorrect result. (Pontier & Hoorn, 2012: 2200-2201) 
There is no one fixed formula that a hybrid system must follow. This is the advantage 
of this approach. Top-down and bottom-up approaches can be combined in a way that is the 
most effective in particular solution. Of course, due to the complex nature of different systems 
and theories, issues with merging will arise, but nevertheless there is a great promise of 
dynamics and adaptability in the hybrid approach. 
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2.4 Domain-specific ethics 
 
Machines so far are designed to function in a specific domain and defining what is 
ethically acceptable in a particular domain is an easier task than trying to create a general theory 
of ethical behaviour at once (Anderson, 2011: 25). There are many areas which have a rather 
wide consensus on what is and what is not ethical in that domain. Medical ethics is one of the 
examples here (Pontier & Hoorn, 2012: 2199).  
 In many cases, implementing general ethics would be unnecessary. A machine with a 
narrow AI would not have any use for a large part of general ethics. Moreover, it probably does 
not even have the means to comprehend the situations that are outside of its domain, let alone 
have the ability to apply ethical principles there.  
The magnitude of the task of implementing general ethics stems from the level of details 
that is required to make it usable for a machine. As mentioned earlier, ethical approaches tend 
to be rather abstract which would make them incomprehensible to the machine. Ambiguity in 
a machine’s code can yield unexpected and undesired results which means that these abstract 
concepts must be turned into very specific code. 
Domain-specific ethics could pave the way to generalizations that may be applicable to 
other domains (Anderson, 2011: 25). Creating general machine ethics will be an incremental 
process. Starting from domain-specific ethics it could be expanded over time, eventually 
reaching generality. Now it could be asked, what if ethics from different domains cannot be 
consolidated? This is expected and they do not have to be fully compatible. Developing general 
ethics with this approach would mean that it can use the commonalities that arise from domain-
specific ethics. Domain-specific ethics should be considered a starting point or a test bed, from 
where general machine ethics could evolve over time.  
2.5 Ethical approaches in retrospective 
 
Neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches alone seem to be sufficient for 
implementation into a machine. Disadvantages of top-down are abstractness and the generality 
of their concepts. Utilitarianism places heavy computational demands on a machine and 
problems can arise with acquiring all the relevant information. On the other hand, if offers a 
method to evaluate the morality of an action through its consequences. Deontological 
approaches face possible conflicts between the rules and within the same rule. Then again, the 
advantage of these rules is that they can be turned into an algorithm.  
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To overcome these limitations, top-down approaches could be combined with bottom-
up, specifically with machine learning. While machine learning by itself is not yet powerful and 
dynamic enough to be the only means for acquiring ethical principles, it could compensate the 
shortcomings of top-down.  
Attempting to implement general ethics at once might be too extensive task, therefore 
domain-specific ethics seems a more attainable approach. Many specific areas where a machine 
would operate have well-established ethical rules and over time the commonalities in domain-
specific ethics can give rise to general machine ethics. 
  
3. Internal models and functional imagination in ethical machine. 
 
In the previous chapters were mainly discussed different approaches of implementing 
ethical principles into a machine. These are the grounds that a machine bases its decisions on. 
This chapter focuses on a different, more technical feature that can play important role in 
machines decisions. It is called internal model. 
Internal model is a mechanism which is embedded into a machine that allows a machine 
to run a simulation of itself and its perceived environment. A machine with an internal model 
can test what-if hypotheses of its possible actions and their consequences in a given situation, 
without having to actually perform them. (Winfield, Blum, & Liu, 2014: 86) 
Internal models and functional imagination, described below, are not specific to an 
ethical machine but have been used in robots for some time with different purposes (Winfield 
et al., 2014: 86-87). The role of internal model in ethical machine is to enable machine to 
anticipate the situations that require ethical decisions and in simulation play through different 
actions. This, as mentioned before, enables the machine find out the consequences of the actions 
without having to try them out in real life. As a result, a machine can choose action with best 
possible consequences. 
The concept of using internal model for the purpose of ethics in a machine was proposed 
by A. Winfield, C. Blum and W. Liu (2014). More detailed overview of their experiment is 
given further below. Before that a short overview of functional imagination will be given which 
is general concept of the internal model in a machine. 
Functional imagination is system that lets the machine to simulate actions, predict their 
consequences and elicit possible behavioural benefit in the process. Behavioural benefit here is 
understood as obtained net reward in relation to either external or internal factors. (Marques & 
Holland, 2009: 746) 
Functional imagination can have two types of forward models. These models are used 
to predict the next state of the system in regard of current state and executed action. Unmediated 
forward model takes current state and action as input and gives predicted state as output. 
Mediated forward model utilizes an intricate simulation where outputs are determined through 
27 Rene Tõnisson – Can Autonomous Machines Make Ethical Decisions? 
 
the reconciliation of self-model interacting with a simulated world. (Marques & Holland, 2009: 
746)  
For properly working functional imagination, it is essential that agent can select several 
different actions in the particular situation that it is simulating. (Marques & Holland, 2009: 747) 
Obviously, the actions that can be selected in simulation, must be the same that can be selected 
in external situation.   
Important characteristic of functional imagination system is how many steps ahead it is 
capable of simulating. The simplest case is a system that can simulate only one step ahead, more 
complicated systems can simulate multiple steps. In multi-step systems, number of possible 
steps is mainly determined by its computing power but there may be also other limiting factors 
such as noise. (Marques & Holland, 2009:748) 
Another relevant factor is, whether system stores the solutions of previously successful 
solutions of the encountered problems (memorising) or not (memoryless). (Marques & Holland, 
2009: 748) For an ethical machine it would be useful to store previous cases for learning 
purposes and reusing them in similar future situations, which can save time it takes to make a 
decision.        
A. Winfield, C. Blum and W. Liu (2014:86) implemented this kind of internal model in 
an ethical action selection mechanism called consequence engine. 
Consequence engine is not tightly integrated into robot’s controller, rather it is running 
in parallel with it and is separable. This means that robot can run effectively without it, but is 
not able to estimate the consequences of its actions. (Winfield et al., 2014:87) 
CE is capable of modelling possible threats for all the actors and itself in the perceived 
environment. Capability of anticipating the outcomes of agent’s actions in the environment 
allegedly gives the machine very basic theory of mind for that other agent. When all possible 
actions have been tested, the most suitable action will be sent to a robot’s controller. (Winfield 
et al., 2014: 87) 
 They tested CE with small mobile robots, where robot A contained CE, and other robots, 
that represented humans, did not. In the field where these machines moved around, was a virtual 
hole (harm), that robot A could perceive and others could not. The goal for robot A was to avoid 
the hole and also keep other robots from reaching the hole. (Winfield et al., 2014: 90) 
When robot A was moving in the simulation field alone, it managed to avoid the hole 
(stay safe) 100% of times. In trial where there was another robot H (representing human), robot 
A’s CE recognized that H is on path of danger and diverted from its own trajectory, managing 
to successfully save H and also stay safe itself. (Winfield et al., 2014: 8-9) 
28 Rene Tõnisson – Can Autonomous Machines Make Ethical Decisions? 
 
In the third trial they added another robot H2 to the arena. In this case robot A managed 
to save human representing robot 58% of times and both 9% of times. However, this was not 
because of choice, but because of noise. The robots did not start at the same time or not from 
the same position and CE indicated one of the H’s problems first or there was enough time to 
also reach second robot H after saving the first. If all things were equal, CE did not have 
preference for either of H robots, meaning that robot A got stuck in a dilemma and did not save 
either of them. (Winfield et al., 2014: 92-93) 
Authors of this experiment noted that to solve this issue, they could have introduced 
some sort of heuristic or a rule, but they deliberately did not as it should not be solved with 
engineering but with ethics. (Winfield et al., 2014: 95) 
This experiment illustrates the importance of using internal model in a machine. It 
enables a machine to predict possible course of events and consider suitable ethical action (in 
this case to prevent “human” from coming to harm). Even though the environment and number 
of actors in this experiment were very small, it revealed some important aspects. First one was 
already mentioned importance of internal model which enables to predict consequences. 
Second, is the problem of the ethical dilemmas. In situation where two “humans” were moving 
towards danger, often the robot could not decide which one it should save and eventually saved 
neither of them. If a machine ends up in this kind of a deadlock, it means that the values for 
actions to choose from are equal and it needs additional criteria to make a choice. If that 
criterion cannot be found, there is something missing from the ethical approach that was 
implemented in the machine. Since, ethical approaches are not perfect, there should be 
implemented a contingency principle that can add additional value to one of the choices in a 
dilemma. This contingency principle cannot be universal, because the solution would depend 
on the particular implementation that a machine has. 
  
4. Decisions, responsibility and moral status 
 
One could argue that the machine’s decisions are not made by a machine but by humans 
who created the machine and the program that is running it. Even though humans definitely 
play significant part in the process, every individual judgement made by a machine cannot be 
attributed to its human creators. For example, every single move made by a chess-playing 
computer or every individual diagnosis given by a medical diagnosis advisor cannot be 
attributed to designers and developers of the program. Applications like these are normally 
created by the teams that contain several people with different specialties. Many of those people 
probably play chess much worse than the program or are not at all familiar with a medical 
diagnosis on a professional level. (Whitby, 2011: 142) 
The assumption that machines only follow the program that is implemented in them is 
misleading. This may be true in case of very simple solutions, but it is not so straightforward in 
much more complex systems. Program as a set of instructions is indeed essential part of it, but 
a programmer does not determine every possible outcome there is. For example, a system that 
incorporates machine learning or case-based reasoning will have evolving responses and 
generalizations in the light of the new information it acquires. More adequate explanation would 
be that a programmer created a collection of decision-making procedures which enable a 
machine to make decisions in a given situation. (Whitby, 2011: 140-141) Of course this does 
not mean that the machine is not limited in its actions, it is still bound to the range of activity 
that its code allows. 
From machine’s perspective ethical decision is no different from any other decision it 
makes. It could act and reason ethically, yet it would not know it was being ethical. To know 
what ethical was, the machine would have to encounter a situation where it is torn between 
acting in self-interest or in the interest of someone it cares about and doing the right, ethical 
thing. (McDermott, 2011: 89) According to this, a machine would have to have self and likely 
self-awareness, to make ethical decisions. Currently there are not yet self-aware machines and 
the machines are also not capable of caring about someone, but they can be developed to act in 
the interest of their creators or their owners. In this case a machine can be caught between 
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ethical decision and acting in the interest of its owner. This, however, would not bring it closer 
to knowing what ethical was, since acting in someone’s interest would mean that its algorithm 
is created in a way that prioritizes particular individuals over others, regardless of the ethical 
principles that have been implemented into the machine. To actually understand the difference 
a machine would have to have some sort of awareness.  
Prevalent thought tends to be that to behave ethically one must be able to act 
intentionally, have consciousness and free will. Having sentience and emotions are also seen as 
essential factors, because only someone who has feelings is able to comprehend the feelings of 
the others. Machines do not possess these qualities and it is not sure that they ever will, which 
seems to prevent them from becoming moral agents. (S. L. Anderson, 2011: 164) 
S. L. Anderson (2011) says that free will and intentionality are necessary if someone 
has to be held morally responsible for the action. Yet, these are not needed to perform morally 
correct action in situation which requires a machine to behave ethically and to be able to justify 
it. All that is expected from the machine, is making a decision which is in compliance with what 
is considered an ethically correct behaviour in specific situation and the reasoning behind that 
decision can be traced back to the ethical principle, which it was based on. (S. L. Anderson, 
2011: 164) 
 A machine itself being able to justify its decisions should not be taken too literally. At 
this point of time it would mean that a system can be put in place which logs the reasoning and 
actions of the machine and can be later used to see how it reached the decisions it made. A 
machine would make ethical decisions according to the ethical principle that is implemented in 
it and the information it has acquired from the world about the current situation. The validity 
of the machine’s decision would come down to quality of the implementation of an ethical 
principle and how satisfactory the principle is, as well as to how sufficiently the machine is 
capable of acquiring relevant information from the world. A machine itself is not capable of 
judging if and how ethical its decision was. In a way, it could be said that machine imitates 
ethical behaviour, but does not understand what it is doing.  
 
4.1 Who is responsible for the mistakes of a machine? 
 
No matter how well developed and tested a machine is, there always remains a 
possibility, that it will make a mistake. While consequences of the mistakes of some machines 
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may be negligible, the mistakes of others such as autonomous vehicles or military robots, can 
be lethal. Which leads to a question, who should be held responsible? There is no sense in 
holding a machine responsible for its actions as it does not even have necessary features to 
comprehend what responsibility is. R. Sparrow (2007: 72) has said that a machine cannot be 
punished, because it cannot suffer. Only thing that can be done in regard of the machine, is 
either removing it from circulation or finding the cause(s) of the mistake and improving the 
machine. This means that the responsibility must lie somewhere else.   
A. Matthias (2004) states that there is a responsibility gap between machines and 
humans. Since autonomous machines can act on their own, they learn and adapt though 
interaction with environment and other agents. Designers and programmers do not have the 
same control over the behaviour of the software and machine as they did with regular programs. 
This results in a gradual process, where designers and programmers of a machine progressively 
transfer control over to the machine itself. On one hand, creators of the machine do not have 
sufficient control over it anymore and on the other hand, the machine itself cannot be held 
accountable for its actions, this is what Matthias calls the responsibility gap. (Matthias, 2004: 
181-183).  
Sparrows (2007) comes to a similar conclusion.  For example, if an autonomous military 
machine makes a decision which results in a war crime, who is responsible? Given the increase 
of the autonomy of the system, increases the possibility that it makes a decision which was not 
predicted by programmers. To hold the programmers or the designers responsible is similar to 
holding parents responsible for the actions of their adult children who have left home. (Sparrow, 
2007: 69-70)   
Another option would be to hold responsible a commanding officer that ordered the 
deployment. If military forces have accepted responsibility for possible cases where the 
machine makes a wrong decision, then responsibility would lie on the officer. This would mean 
that these military forces can be held responsible for errors of the autonomous systems over 
which decisions they actually do not have control. Sparrows concludes here that at one point, 
the machine’s autonomy has grown to the state where it would not be fair anymore to hold the 
commanding officer responsible. (Sparrow, 2007: 70-71) 
Neither of Matthias nor Sparrow offer a solution to how to fill this gap of responsibility, 
without reverting full responsibility back to humans. Sparrow (2007: 74) says that currently 
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only way seems to be assigning responsibility to relevant individual, which would still be unfair, 
because it makes them responsible for the actions they cannot control.  
Since humans cannot share the responsibility with the machine and the machine cannot 
be held responsible for its actions, then eventually the responsibility will lie solely on either 
machine’s designers/programmers/manufacturers, on its owners or on both. If it will be shared 
responsibility between parties involved or one sole entity that will be held liable, is probably 
going to be solved in courts, rather than in philosophical discussions. 
4.2 Can machines have moral status? 
 
M. A. Warren (2003: 446) proposed list of the principles of moral status, where each 
principle is based on a certain criteria. I will not expand further on the principles themselves, 
but will give overview of underlying criteria, because these give unambiguous basis for 
comparison with the machines. 
First, Warren (2003) offers a scale where all living beings have some moral status. 
Moving further on the scale, sentient creatures have stronger moral status than non-sentient 
ones. From there on, beings who have moral agency have stronger moral status than those, who 
do not. In addition she includes social and ecological relationships. Animals that are endangered 
by human activities and have important role in their ecosystem, have stronger moral status, than 
compared to the ones that are simply on aforementioned scale. Human infants have stronger 
moral status than animals because of our social relationship with them. (Warren, 2003: 445-
446) 
The fact that machines are not alive would not necessarily exclude them from moral 
status if they were sentient. Self-awareness and moral agency would be further arguments 
towards moral status. In their current state and at least in near future the machines are not 
sentient nor self-aware or moral agents. This does not necessarily mean that they can never be 
but it is not the reality now. Non-sentient machines cannot suffer nor enjoy and cannot perceive 
harm in a similar way that living, sentient beings can, which means that the machines are not 
likely to have any moral status (Warren, 2003: 449).  
In this context, being able to do ethically acceptable decisions or imitate ethical actions, 
does not change anything for the machines that are being discussed in this thesis. They would 
not have moral status regardless of how accurate their decisions would be because they have 
no sentiency, self-awareness or moral agency.
 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has discussed whether autonomous machines are capable of making ethical 
decisions. Important aspect of ethical decision making is that a machine has an ethical principle 
implemented, on which it can base its decisions. Top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches 
to implementing ethical principle were discussed.  
Top-down approaches are based on some established ethical theory. Utilitarianism, 
deontological approaches and virtue ethics were covered under this category. Common problem 
of all top-down approaches is their abstractness which is not comprehensible to a machine.  
Implementation of this kind of approach needs translating abstract or vague concepts into 
machine readable details.  
Utilitarianism is appealing to machine ethics, because its promise of calculability of 
ethics. Due to large computational demands and unfeasible requirements of acquiring necessary 
information makes implementing utilitarianism in its full extent impractical. It should not be 
entirely disregarded though, as with limited scope it could be used as fall-back mechanism.  
Advantages of deontological approaches are rules, which could be turned into an 
algorithm for a machine. Problematic aspects are possible conflicts that can arise between the 
rules or within the same rule. This could result in a deadlock in a machine and the machine not 
making any decision at all.   
Virtue ethics does not seem to be appropriate for autonomous machine, since a machine 
is built for some specific actions. Virtue ethics on the other hand focuses on developing a 
character, which is not what the machine is created for.  
Next were discussed bottom-up approaches, which mean acquiring ethical principles 
through a simulated artificial life evolution or a machine learning. In case of ALife evolution, 
it could be possible that in the future when simulations are complex enough, they could give 
rise to artificial entities with evolving ethics, but at this time it cannot be done yet. With machine 
learning a machine could learn ethics from large number of example situations. However, a 
machine is not yet close the way that humans learn and not able to acquire ethical norms on its 
own. Moreover, machine that is learning completely on its own could possibly be dangerous, 
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since it could learn wrong things. Currently machine learning is not in state that machine could 
become ethical only through learning but it can be used as complementary approach to some 
top-down theory. 
Hybrid approaches are the ones that combine top-down and bottom-up approaches. This 
seems most feasible solution, since the shortcoming of one approach could be compensated by 
the other one. 
Finally, the advantage of domain-specific approach was discussed, which would mean 
that instead of trying to implement general ethics to a machine, there would be implemented 
ethics that is specific to a domain that the machine operates in. This would be simpler task and 
since machines are made with specific purpose they cannot apply general ethics all the way. In 
the bigger picture, domain-specific ethics could give rise to general ethics through 
consolidation. 
After discussing ethical approaches, the role of internal model was briefly discussed in 
machine’s ethical decision making. Internal model enables the machine to simulate its actions 
and consequences in environment and in regard of other agents. It enables machine to foresee 
possible chain of events and find the most suitable action in a current situation, without trying 
out all the actions.  
Eventually, different aspects of machine’s ethical decision making were discussed. 
Since machine does not have consciousness, free will and intentionality, it cannot be held 
responsible for its actions. It also does not have awareness and self-interest, which means that 
it does not make ethical decisions in the same sense as humans do. However, with properly 
implemented ethical principles and adequate information acquisition it could be able to make 
the decisions that are considered ethically appropriate in a given situation. Since the machine 
does not have awareness of what it is doing in the sense that a morally responsible human does, 
then it would mean that it is acting unknowingly. 
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 Can Autonomous Machines Make Ethical Decisions? 
Abstract 
This thesis explores whether autonomous machines are capable of making ethical 
decisions. An autonomous machine here is understood as a machine which operates without 
direct human intervention and is controlled by artificial intelligence. Author discusses 
advantages and disadvantages of different ethical approaches which could be used by a machine 
as basis for its decisions. These approaches cover both classical theories such as utilitarianism 
and alternative concepts such as building ethics from ground up through machine learning. 
Domain-specific ethics is suggested as more attainable goal than implementing general ethics. 
Nature of machine’s decision making is covered. Since machines do not have consciousness, 
free will, intentionality and self-interest, author concludes that they are not capable of making 
ethical decisions in the same sense as humans are. Nevertheless, with properly implemented 
ethical principles and ability to acquire information from the world, machine is capable making 
decisions that are considered ethically appropriate in particular situation. 
 Kas autonoomsed masinad suudavad teha eetilisi otsuseid? 
Resümee 
Käesolev bakalaureusetöö küsib, kas autonoomsed masinad suudavad teha eetilisi 
otsuseid. Autonoomse masina all mõeldakse siin selliseid masinad, mis on võimelised 
tegutsema ilma pideva inimese poolse juhtimiseta ning mida kontrollib tehisintellekt. Autor 
arutleb eeliste ja puuduste üle, mis on erinevatel eetilistel printsiipidel, mida masin saaks 
kasutada alusena oma otsuste tegemisel. Siia on kaasatud nii klassikalised eetikateooriad nagu 
näiteks utilitarism kui ka alternatiivsed lähenemised nagu juhtumipõhine masinõpe. Samuti 
leitakse, et valdkonnapõhise eetika masinasse juurutamine oleks kergem, kui püüd korraga 
arendada üldisel eetikal põhinevat masinat. Vaadeldakse ka üldist masinapoolse 
otsustusprotsessi olemust ning jõutakse järeldusele, et kuna masinal puudub teadvus, vaba tahe, 
kavatsuslikkus ja omakasupüüdlikkus, siis ei ole masinad võimelised tegema eetilisi otsuseid 
sel moel nagu inimene. Sellest hoolimata on masinad võimelised tegema otsuseid, mida saab 
pidada eetiliseks mingis kindlas situatsioonis, juhul kui neisse on implementeeritud sobiv 
eetiline printsiip ning masin suudab koguda adekvaatset infot end ümbritseva kohta. 
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